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Global Infectious Disease Surveillance And
Health Intelligence
The development of effective, interconnected systems of infectious
disease surveillance is essential to our survival.
by Stephen S. Morse
ABSTRACT: Current concerns about the spread of infectious diseases, especially unex-
pected (“emerging”) infections such as pandemic influenza or severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS), have renewed focus on the critical importance of global early warning and
rapid response. Although considerable progress has been made, many gaps remain. A
number of the gaps can be addressed through increased political will, resources for report-
ing, improved coordination and sharing of information, raising clinicians’ awareness, and
additional research to develop more rigorous triggers for action. The increasing availability
of communications and information technologies worldwide offers new opportunities for re-
porting even in low-capacity settings. [Health Affairs 26, no. 4 (2007): 1069–1077;
10.1377/hlthaff.26.4.1069]
I
nfect ious di sease s remain the ma-
jor causes of illness and death worldwide.1
Current concern includes H5N1 influenza
(avian flu), which has caused over 170 human
deaths in twelve countries and is still ongo-
ing. Could this avian virus become more
transmissible person-to-person? With pres-
ent knowledge, this cannot be determined
unless it actually occurs. If H5N1 evolved to
become efficiently transmitted, it could cause
the next influenza pandemic.2 Or, quite pos-
sibly, another as yet unnoticed flu virus could
make the leap. Although the 1918 influenza
pandemic might be unique, it caused an esti-
mated fifty million deaths worldwide, mak-
ing it one of the greatest natural disasters in
history.3
It is widely agreed that the key to control of
any pandemic is early identification and rapid
response.4 This must begin with effective early
warning. However, given the current state of
surveillance and the expected delays in report-
ing and lab confirmation, few are optimistic
about this happening.5 A few years ago, the se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus
infected more than 8,000 people, causing 774
recorded deaths.6 The worldwide SARS out-
break began with thirteen people infected in
Hong Kong. If others had been warned in time,
perhaps cases and deaths in Vietnam or To-
ronto could have been prevented.
SARS and human infections with H5N1 in-
fluenza, as well as HIV/AIDS (which has ex-
acted a terrible toll in much of the world, espe-
cially Africa), are examples of “emerging
infections,” which were unknown to medicine
until recently.7 It is likely that the emergence of
such diseases will continue and possibly even
increase in the future, making early warning
increasingly critical.8
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A Brief Surveillance Lexicon
 “Health intelligence.” This paper deals
specifically with infectious disease surveil-
lance (a term developed by the late Alexander
Langmuir at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, or CDC) and response, but
many of the issues discussed here apply to
other types of health events such as noncom-
municable diseases.9 Because there are poten-
tially many different types of disease reporting
and health information, I suggest the term
“health intelligence” to refer broadly to usable
information on events of public health signifi-
cance. Analogously, the CDC and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) have re-
ferred to “BioIntelligence,” while Canada has a
program, discussed later, called the Global
Public Health Intelligence Network.
There are a variety of classical data sources
for health intelligence, including clinical re-
ports, notifiable disease reporting, lab reports,
pathology results, registries, and death re-
cords. Traditionally, clinical reports have been
most important. In general, all health intelli-
gence originates at the local level, usually as
clinical information. People are fond of refer-
ring to the “proverbial astute clinician” who
notices the deviation from the norm. Usually,
clinical cases are identified and samples from
patients are tested in the laboratory to identify
the pathogen. Epidemiologic investigation, to
determine source of infection and additional
exposures, is usually carried out in parallel
and, together with laboratory identification,
helps inform disease control measures.10
 “Syndromic surveillance.” In recent
years, “syndromic surveillance” has also been
developed.11 This term once referred to the use
of clinical syndromes as criteria for reporting.12
Now, it usually means data collected from au-
tomated nondiagnostic systems such as phar-
macy records, ambulance call categories, per-
sonnel absences, or emergency department
(ED) chief complaints.13 Although this ap-
proach is very promising, ways to optimize its
use are still in development.14
 Local knowledge. In most areas of the
world, there is still no substitute for local
knowledge. Wilbur Downs, at Yale, referred to
the “umbrella of malaria” in tropical regions,
and it requires local medical knowledge to dif-
ferentiate a case of, say, yellow fever from the
many cases of malaria found in the same ar-
eas.15 After Western medicine “discovered”
AIDS, researchers found African accounts of
people getting “slims” disease: AIDS by an-
other name. The 1995 Ebola virus outbreak in
Kikwit, Congo, was first identified in May and
immediately galvanized a rapid world re-
sponse. However, the outbreak might have
started several months before, with recogni-
tion delayed by an outbreak of bloody diarrhea
caused by Shigella (leading James Hughes, then
director of the CDC National Center for Infec-
tious Diseases, to remark that although it
would have been useful to have the reagents to
diagnose Ebola locally, it would have been
equally useful just to be able to diagnose
shigellosis routinely).16
Surveillance Systems Around The
World
Most surveillance systems are passive and
disease-specific. This means that there are nu-
merous individual systems, which often lack
information-sharing mechanisms, and “new”
or currently unknown diseases might be
picked up only haphazardly. Once a newly rec-
ognized disease is sufficiently important to
warrant notice, it, too, may eventually get its
own dedicated surveillance system (HIV/
AIDS, for example). With such fragmentation,
the system can only be reactive at best. Fur-
thermore, each country has its own arrange-
ment, reflecting the organization of its public
health system.
 U.S. surveillance systems. In the
United States, each state is responsible for sur-
veillance and reporting, using a consensus list
of reportable diseases by the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). These
diseases are reported locally to the state and
then by the state to the CDC. States may also
add other diseases that they wish local physi-
cians to report. Outbreak assistance from the
CDC must be requested by the state (or, in
some cases, a large city). Although the CDC
can provide aid only when requested, in prac-
1 0 7 0 J u l y / A u g u s t 2 0 0 7
H e a l t h T r a c k i n g
tice, it has liaison officers in many state and
large city health departments and may be in-
volved at least informally.
 Other countries’ systems. Other coun-
tries with federal systems generally have simi-
lar arrangements, while many countries have
more centralized surveillance and control
functions to provide assistance to localities.
Some regional capabilities exist. In addition to
national surveillance programs, western Eu-
rope has “Eurosurveillance” (a weekly epide-
miological bulletin consoli-
dating national surveillance
results) and the recent begin-
nings of a “European CDC,”
with headquarters in Stock-
holm.
 Central control and
effectiveness. It is widely
assumed that countries with
highly centralized political
control have more-effective
surveillance systems. This assumption is mis-
taken; there is no simple relationship between
central control and effective surveillance. In
China, it was often remarked in the world
press during the SARS outbreak that reporting
relations between localities and the capital
were very weak.17 In some countries there may
also be a fear of political repercussions.
 Local agricultural and animal dis-
eases. Many countries also have reportable
agricultural diseases and veterinary diagnostic
laboratories. As many diseases of concern are
zoonotic (from other animal species), it is nec-
essary for the veterinary and human disease
systems to share information and diagnostic
resources. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
maintains a reference diagnostic laboratory, as
well as agricultural extension stations and
field agents to help farmers; therefore, unlike
the human health community, case identifica-
tion does not rely exclusively on local clini-
cians to notice disease problems.
 Work of the WHO. At the international
level, the World Health Organization (WHO)
is the coordinating body but is dependent on
its member states for reporting. The WHO has
a number of country and regional representa-
tives intended to provide liaison and commu-
nication with national governments.
One recent development at the WHO
seems especially promising. The WHO Inter-
national Health Regulations (IHR) provide the
instructions for nations to report diseases
found in incoming travelers. The IHR formerly
required international reporting of only chol-
era, plague, yellow fever, and (until it was
eradicated) smallpox, but the regulations have
recently been revised to encompass a broader
syndrome-oriented approach
that would accommodate
warnings of unknown infec-
tious diseases. According to
the WHO, “The broadened
purpose and scope of the new
IHR (2005) are to ‘prevent,
protect against, control and
provide a public health re-
sponse to the international
spread of disease and…avoid
unnecessary interference with international
traffic and trade’.”18 Although developing and
gaining acceptance for the new IHR approach
has taken time and patience, it seems well
along now. Implementing the new IHR (2005)
will require each nation to have a real-time
event-monitoring system and strengthened
surveillance capabilities. However, each nation
must fund the program from its own re-
sources, and many will require financial help
and other incentives.
Outlook For Global Surveillance
Capabilities
Despite the gaps noted, with all of these ca-
pabilities, one might expect the outlook to be
rosy. Unfortunately, as the spread of SARS at-
tests, this is not the case. It is widely recog-
nized that the state of global infectious disease
surveillance and response is variable and, in
most of the world, varies from weak to virtu-
ally nonexistent. This is true despite the fact
that infectious diseases of possible signifi-
cance can originate anywhere in the world,
and many have originated in places with lim-
ited surveillance capacity. Several factors com-
bine to limit global capabilities.
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“The state of global
infectious disease
surveillance and
response in most of
the world varies from
weak to virtually
nonexistent.”
 Health’s low priority on government
agendas. First, despite its life-and-death na-
ture, health does not generally have a high pri-
ority in most governments, compared with
other ministries. Other than educating policy-
makers, I see little that can be done to change
this situation. In many cases, ministerial inter-
ests may be divergent. Agriculture ministries
might wish to increase density of farmed ani-
mals to reduce production costs, while public
health experts might warn of the potential
risks to human health of doing so.
 Delayed reporting of disease informa-
tion. Second, governments are often reluctant
to report disease information for fear of politi-
cal embarrassment, economic or trade reper-
cussions, or concern that it may make the gov-
ernment look ineffectual. China began to
experience an outbreak of SARS in November
2002 (if not earlier) but did not begin report-
ing it until February 2003, by which time the
government listed 305 cases.19
Thus, there are many perceived disincen-
tives for reporting disease. Are there any incen-
tives? I think that the answer is: too few. After
the SARS outbreak, it was hoped that the tre-
mendous impact on Asian travel, and the cor-
responding loss of revenue largely attributable
to delayed reporting, would encourage govern-
ments to be more proactive in reporting dis-
eases.20 Anecdotal reports from Toronto sug-
gest that Canadians felt punished, not
rewarded, for promptly reporting SARS cases,
although it is likely that Canada will continue
to be as forthcoming as in the past.21 Despite its
earlier experiences with SARS, China did not
report a November 2003 human H5N1 influ-
enza case until 2006.22 This is not to single out
China, which has been doing a great deal to
strengthen its disease surveillance capacity.23
Delays in reporting are simply all too frequent
worldwide.
 Competition for public health re-
sources. Although infectious disease activi-
ties may be among those most evident to the
public, they represent only a portion of the
many essential functions of public health and
may fall victim to perceptions of competing
priorities for limited resources. In the 1960s,
the WHO’s governing body, the World Health
Assembly, held technical discussions on global
surveillance of infectious diseases, but these
were never followed up on, reportedly because
of concerns that surveillance might compete
with primary health care resources for devel-
oping countries.24 In my view, this is a false di-
chotomy, as both are needed, and (as we will
later see) surveillance activities both benefit
from the presence of a health infrastructure
and can usefully add to its effectiveness.
It is essential to provide additional incen-
tives. Different incentives will likely apply at
different levels. At the local or district level,
training, feedback, and epidemiological or
clinical assistance to the reporting clinicians
and local public health are possible incentives.
At the country level, financial incentives and
resources are needed to encourage reporting as
well as to expand the reach of the primary
health care and communications infrastruc-
tures. Other psychological incentives, such as
increased national prestige for recognizing an
unusual disease, should also be considered.
Encouragement from the international com-
munity, to overcome a country’s fear of adverse
consequences and help leverage resources, is
also necessary.
An Attempt To Reduce The
Fragmentation Of Surveillance
Systems
 The plan. In an attempt to reduce what
many (including myself) saw as the fragmen-
tation of disease surveillance systems and the
lack of global capacity, the Program for Moni-
toring Emerging Diseases (ProMED) was be-
gun in 1993 by a group of concerned scientists,
under the auspices of the Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists. At meetings in Geneva and else-
where, a steering committee recommended de-
veloping a system of regional centers to
identify and respond to unusual disease out-
breaks.25 This elaborated on the system D.A.
Henderson proposed at a 1989 National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) meeting.26
One would think that it should be fairly
simple to network regional centers of excel-
lence to augment official systems and allow
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mutual cooperation, whether through the
WHO or through regional intergovernmental
organizations. On the other hand, if diseases
can emerge anywhere, how can one get reports
from literally everywhere? The latter seemed
the harder task, so we decided to try tackling
the easier one first.
The original ProMED concept, from the
mid-1990s, was to plan a system that could
provide early warning for both emerging (cur-
rently unknown or unanticipated) infections
as well as familiar ones. The strategy devel-
oped was vigilance for unusual clinical presen-
tations of special concern (such as encephalitis
or acute respiratory distress with fever in
adults); a set of minimum microbiology capa-
bilities at each site, to identify common dis-
eases; and a system to refer unidentifiable sam-
ples to successively larger reference labs,
through the network, for possible identifica-
tion. The plan also included epidemiologic ca-
pacity, which could be provided rapidly
through the network if needed.27
 Connectivity but no global network. It
soon became apparent that the sixty or so
steering committee members from around the
globe had no consistent means of communica-
tion with the chair (myself) or others in the
network. As a result, in 1994 ProMED con-
nected all of its steering committee members
by e-mail—at that time still novel. Some of the
members were in such underserved places that
satellite uplinks were required (provided
through another nonprofit, SatelLife, in
Boston). The system, originally envisioned as a
direct scientist-to-scientist network, rapidly
grew into a prototype outbreak reporting and
discussion list, especially after the 1995 Ebola
outbreak. Open to all, and edited (moderated)
by a group of scientists, public health, and in-
fectious disease experts, ProMED-mail (now a
program of the International Society for Infec-
tious Diseases) has grown along with the
Internet and now has more than 30,000 sub-
scribers in some 155 countries. Among the no-
table outbreaks first reported on ProMED-
mail were the early reports of SARS in China
(10 February 2003) and Toronto; a multistate
outbreak of meningococcal meningitis, in both
the United Kingdom and the United States, in
1995; H5N1 influenza in Indonesia, November
2003; and fatalities in China in 2005 attributed
to Streptococcus suis.28 In fact, with the rapid
growth of the Internet over the past decade, it
is now possible to have reports from much of
the world. At the same time, although steps
have been made toward the original goal of a
network of periurban centers, there is still no
fully functional global network of the sort en-
visioned by Henderson or in the original 1996
ProMED proposal.29 Political will at the lead-
ership level and resource constraints remain
the missing elements. So much for achieving
the simpler goals first.
Impact Of The Communications
Revolution
 Examples of electronic systems. The
information and communications “revolu-
tions” of our time are having major impacts.
During the SARS outbreak, the WHO and col-
laborating scientists made very effective use of
modern communications, such as e-mail and
video teleconferences. The establishment of
ProMED-mail in 1994 inspired the develop-
ment of several other systems, including the
CDC’s Epi-X and an e-mail discussion list of
the Infectious Diseases Society of America.
When ProMED-mail started, virtually no
press content was available electronically.
Later in the 1990s, news reports from around
the world first became available on the Web,
and the Canadian government started an inno-
vative limited-access system, the Global Public
Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), which
electronically searches the World Wide Web
to identify possible news reports of disease
outbreaks. In the past, most of the content on
ProMED-mail had come as postings from sub-
scribers, many of whom are scientists, physi-
cians, or public health officials. In recent years,
an increasing amount of the content on
ProMED-mail, GPHIN, and other electronic
sources is gleaned from press reports and other
open sources.
 Press reports. Although press reports
have the advantage of some immediacy, they
often lack the specificity of reports by knowl-
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edgeable experts. Nevertheless, they have been
remarkably useful and often among the first
indications of an outbreak. During the Kikwit
Ebola outbreak in 1995, it was rumored that a
local Reuters dispatch from January had de-
scribed an outbreak but was not widely no-
ticed (or available).
 Verification methods. Several years
ago, the WHO (under the able leadership of
David Heymann, then executive director for
communicable disease surveillance and re-
sponse) launched an Outbreak Verification
List for follow-up of key outbreak reports
from these and other unofficial sources. These
sources can provide agencies such as the
WHO or the CDC with very useful informa-
tion and can be used to help compel govern-
ments to report outbreaks sooner than they
might otherwise. At the same time, just as
with media reports, the effects are not always
controllable.
 Internet and cell phones. The Internet
has now expanded into many parts of the
world, even in low-income countries. One
promising idea for developing countries is con-
necting remote clinics or health centers to the
Internet, using satellite connections when
necessary. This was done in the past by
SatelLife, partnering with ProMED, and more
recently in Haiti by Partners in Health.30 How-
ever, resource limitations leave critical needs
for additional solutions appropriate to these
areas. Voxiva uses short messaging system
(SMS) or Web-based forms to report various
disease emergencies via cell phone. Numeric
codes can be used to represent various types of
symptoms or disease emergencies, which are
transmitted to a central office.31 With the wide
availability of cell phones now, even in many
low-income villages, this ingenious approach
could alert authorities rapidly to a problem.
Following on outbreak-reporting projects in
Peru and Rwanda, Voxiva is now working in In-
donesia to report cases of suspected avian flu.32
Progress Over The Past Ten Years
How do early warning capabilities of today
compare with the situation of ten years ago?33
To be sure, much progress has been made.34
National systems in many countries, including
the United States, Canada, Thailand, China,
and Vietnam (as just a few examples), have ex-
panded. As already discussed, electronic net-
works have been developed, and in recent
years, the WHO has begun both collecting
and providing information in near real time—
for example, on its Web site. In recent years,
the WHO has developed a “network of net-
works,” the Global Outbreak and Response
Network (GOARN), with information from a
wide variety of sources; expanded its influ-
enza surveillance; and revised the Interna-
tional Health Regulations to report a broader
scope of infectious diseases, including the pos-
sibility of emerging infections.35
There has also been recent progress in at-
tempts at more-effective data aggregation and
sharing at the national and international re-
gional levels. In the United States, the CDC’s
BioSense is designed to collect clinical data
from hospitals, laboratories, and other provid-
ers for early event detection and eventually to
feed into the DHS National Biosurveillance In-
tegration System (NBIS), the national “um-
brella” for bringing together relevant data.36
There have also been some similar efforts in
other areas of the world, such as MedISys,
from the U.K. government and including sev-
eral other counties. The WHO’s GOARN net-
work of networks has been mentioned, and
there are current efforts to link the WHO and
international animal disease databases.
Recommendations For Further
Progress
These are indications of real progress. Nev-
ertheless, despite these improvements, it is
equally obvious that more is needed. Here are a
few suggestions.
(1) Coordinate reporting systems world-
wide, and ensure compatible standards for ag-
gregating and sharing data. This must begin, of
course, with coordinating human disease re-
porting. Consider strategies for also identify-
ing emerging infections, as in the 1996
ProMED proposal or IHR (2005). As soon as
feasible, improve data sharing and coordina-
tion between human and animal health re-
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sources. A possible prototype for the latter
might be the European MedVetNet (http://
www.medvetnet.org/cms). The WHO would
seem a likely venue for bringing these elements
together globally.
(2) Encourage improvements by providing
additional resources. The highest-yield invest-
ments include coordinating information sys-
tems and implementing exchangeable elec-
tronic medical records; personnel training;
improving epidemiologic capacity at the re-




also remains an issue. To en-
courage international cooper-
ation, the established capabil-
ities of the CDC and other
agencies (for example, the
Institut Pasteur network) for
providing international assis-
tance and training should be augmented.
(3) Further encourage clinicians and health
officials to report by providing useful feed-
back, to provide rapid communications and,
when needed, timely assistance in response.
This can enable every clinician to be the “pro-
verbial astute clinician.” (4) Provide funding
and incentives for full implementation of the
new International Health Regulations. (5) For
developing countries where clinicians are in
short supply, train local people to recognize
and report (or even respond to) some types of
local outbreaks (as in the Voxiva example).
(6) Educate policymakers to consider dis-
ease surveillance a priority. These are global
problems, and it is in everyone’s interest to en-
sure that the necessary resources are available
to all. Prompt reporting and providing accu-
rate and timely public information can save
many lives, increase trust in government, and
avert more-serious consequences.
It should be noted, using the health intelli-
gence analogy, that most of our efforts to date
have focused on collection (that is, reporting),
with some focus on action and relatively little
focus on analysis. Although this might be
largely a result of the rate-limiting nature of
the reporting or data collection step, ways to
improve analysis and disease response must
also be developed.
When To Respond?
A survey of global surveillance returns us to
the earlier example of an influenza pandemic.
Influenza surveillance is one of the best exist-
ing systems worldwide.37 But to prevent a pan-
demic, early warning when the virus reaches
the United States or western Europe is not suf-
ficient. Given the speed with
which such an infection (even
SARS, for that matter) could
travel, it would be far more
desirable to have early warn-
ing at the source. But it is also
essential to have appropriate
response, including both
good response plans and ef-
fective response capabilities.
All of this information has
to be translated into information that policy-
makers can understand and use. For action,
this leads to the inevitable dilemma: When to
respond (and, for that matter, when to stop)?
There is as yet no definite answer. Some pre-
liminary suggestions can be sketched briefly,
to encourage further thought on this critical
issue. Overreacting too often causes political
difficulties and can lead to responder fatigue,
in which many warnings of events that do not
materialize make it difficult or impossible to
mobilize an effective response when needed.
Some professionals, especially in Canada, felt
that the WHO overreacted in issuing travel
advisories during the SARS outbreak in 2003.
On the other hand, past responses have often
been too little and too late. The question of
triggers for response therefore remains crucial,
with both scientific and political dimensions.
The WHO has recently revised its global pan-
demic influenza preparedness plan to begin
incorporating some risk-based triggers, the
last two phases being when fewer than
twenty-five people are infected in cases lasting
less than two weeks and when there is “a clus-
ter of 25–50 cases…lasting from 2 to 4 weeks.”38
While quantitatively a great improvement,
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western Europe is not
sufficient.”
these criteria are still essentially arbitrary. For
influenza, even two weeks may be too late. Re-
cent papers modeling a hypothetical H5N1 in-
fluenza pandemic suggest that the pandemic
could be prevented if (and perhaps only if) tar-
geted disease-control measures began before
more than forty people were infected.39 This
figure suggests urgency. It is borne out by ex-
perience with the global spread of SARS,
which is much less transmissible than most
human flu viruses but which started its world-
wide spread with the infection of only a few
people in Hong Kong.
We should further develop more-rigorous
criteria for triggers, based on epidemiologic
criteria such as transmissibility. There is also
some evidence that at least some pandemics
have been preceded by a “herald wave” or other
foreshadowings, for reasons that are still un-
clear.40
T
o many, the development of truly
effective global systems of infectious
disease surveillance (and, ultimately,
health intelligence) is often relegated to the
“too hard” category. In reality, the problems
are challenging, but not insoluble. Although
the goal is ambitious, we are fortunate to have
better tools (such as rapid global communica-
tions,  electronic  monitoring  of  health  data,
and rapid molecular diagnostics) and more
potential resources than ever before. The in-
creasing number of infections that are contin-
uing to appear, and their greatly increased op-
portunities for rapid global spread, make the
goal both rewarding and essential to our own
survival.
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